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Personality Correlates of Co-witness Suggestibility. 
Abstract 
The present study examined the relationship between co-witness suggestibility and individual 
differences in interpersonal characteristics. Participants (N=473) took part in an eyewitness 
simulation, five independent conditions were used to control for misinformation size. Using 
confederates, the researchers exposed participants to misinformation about the witnessed 
event, prior to collecting their statements. The participants then completed the Fundamental 
Interpersonal Relations Orientation-Behaviour assessment (FIRO-B; Schutz, 1958), a 
measure of expressed and wanted control, affection, and inclusion. Results suggested that the 
wanted control dimension was an accurate predictor of co-witness suggestibility. 
Eyewitnesses who scored highly on Wanted Control, were significantly more likely to accept 
misinformation from co-witnesses; and were more likely to lose confidence in their own 
judgements, after a group discussion. In addition, the results suggest that the unanimity of 
misinformation, but not the size, had a significant influence on co-witness suggestibility. 
Keyword 
Eyewitness suggestibility; Conformity; Interpersonal characteristics; FIRO-B; Individual 
differences; Misinformation effect. 
Introduction 
Co-witness influence on memory reports. 
The malleability of human memory can leave eyewitnesses heavily vulnerable to having their 
recollection of an event contaminated by misleading post-event information (Frenda, Nichols, 
& Loftus, 2011; Loftus, 2005; Skagerberg & Wright, 2008). This can be problematic, as 
numerous studies have demonstrated that inaccurate post-event information can influence 
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eyewitnesses into producing confabulated statements, a phenomenon referred to as the 
misinformation effect (Carlucci, Kieckhaefer, Schwartz, Villalba, & Wright, 2010; Garry, 
French, Kinzett, & Mori, 2008; Paterson & Kemp, 2006). Eyewitnesses can encounter post-
event information through multiple different sources including investigators, co-witnesses 
and media outlets (Gabbert, Memon, & Allan, 2003; Wright, Memon, Skagerberg, & 
Gabbert, 2009); however, research suggests that post-event information is most influential 
when encountered through discussions with other co-witnesses (Paterson & Kemp, 2006). 
Numerous studies have demonstrated that eyewitnesses are susceptible to reporting 
misleading information that is presented to them by co-witnesses (see Thorley, 2015; 
Williamson, Weber, & Robertson, 2013); a behaviour that is more commonly known as 
memory conformity (Thorley, 2015; Wright, Self, & Justice, 2000). Previous studies on co-
witness influence have typically demonstrated the effects of memory conformity by using 
confederates (actors disguised as participants/co-witnesses) to present participants with 
misinformation about a previously witnessed event. Later, when interviewing the 
participants, it has been consistently found that a large proportion of the participants would 
incorporate the confederate’s misinformation into their own memory reports (see Paterson & 
Kemp, 2006; Paterson, Kemp, & Forgas, 2009; Roediger, Meade, & Bergman, 2001). 
Memory conformity can occur as a result of informational influence (Blank, 2009; 
Wright et al., 2009), the process of conforming to others to obtain the correct answer (Wright, 
London, & Waechter, 2009). Eyewitnesses will be aware of the implications that their 
statements will have on an investigation. As a result, many witnesses will be motivated to 
provide an accurate report. However, a heightened need for being correct can persuade an 
eyewitness to report newly learnt misinformation, if they perceive the source to be accurate 
(French, Garry, & Mori, 2011; Williamson et al., 2013). Normative influence, the pressure to 
conform as a means for social approval, can also be used to explain general memory 
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conformity (Wright, London, & Waechter, 2009). Wright et al. (2009) found that during a 
series collaborative memory recall trials, many participants had chosen to conform to their 
partners’ erroneous reports to avoid receiving any negative evaluation from them. However, 
in relation to eyewitness evidence, if police investigators are trained to collect statements 
privately, a witness’s statement would bear no social repercussions and thus, the level of 
normative influence would be significantly reduced.  
 
Co-witness influence on eyewitness confidence. 
Exposure to co-witness misinformation can also influence the level of confidence a witness 
will have in their statement, which can consequently have an impact on their willingness to 
give evidence in court (Allwood, Knutsson, & Granhag, 2005; Luus & Wells, 1994; 
Semmler, Brewer, & Wells, 2004; Skagerberg & Wright, 2009). Exposure to co-witness 
misinformation can have varying effects on an eyewitness’s confidence depending on their 
initial interpretation of the event, and whether they conform to the misinformation in their 
final report. In cases where the witness conforms to misinformation that contradicts with their 
original recollection, research suggests that many witnesses would lose confidence in their 
reconstructed reports. Gabbert et al. (2003) compared the self-reported confidence scores of 
participants who had been exposed to misinformation from co-witnesses with participants 
from a control group (no misinformation was presented). Their study found that younger 
participants (18-30 years) were less confident in their statements, when recalling unwitnessed 
information. However, older eyewitnesses (60-80 years) exhibited the same level of 
confidence in their statements when recalling both witnessed and unwitnessed information, 
suggesting that the effects of co-witness discussions on eyewitness confidence may be 
mediated by the individual’s age. 
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In cases where the witness encounters contradicting information but refrains from 
conforming to the misinformation, research suggests that exposure to the disconfirmatory 
information would reduce the witness’s confidence in their memory report. Luus and Wells 
(1994) presented participants with feedback regarding their co-witness’s responses during a 
line-up identification task. The study found that confidence deflation occurred when the 
participants were told that their co-witness’s response contradicted theirs. However, although 
the study suggests that exposure to conflicting information can reduce a witness’s confidence 
in their original recollection, other studies which have recreated the experimental paradigm 
have failed to find such a relationship between co-witness misinformation and confidence 
deflation (see Allwood et al., 2005; Skagerberg & Wright, 2009). 
In cases where the witness already holds incorrect recollection of the event prior to 
discussing the event with co-witnesses, research suggests that exposure to similar 
misinformation could cause the witness to gain more confidence in their erroneous memory 
report (Allwood et al., 2006; Semmler et al., 2004). Allwood et al. (2006) presented 
participants with post-identification feedback in the form of a written statement from a 
previous participant. The study found that participants who were exposed to a confirmatory 
feedback were more likely to report higher levels of confidence, relative to participants who 
had not received any feedback.  
 
Individual differences in co-witness influence 
Through reviewing the existing literature on co-witness influence, it is apparent that some 
individuals seem to be more vulnerable to co-witness influence than others (Gabbert et al., 
2003; Goodwin, Kukucka, & Hawks, 2012; Levett, 2011; Paterson et al., 2009). Researchers 
have previously suggested that an individual’s vulnerability to co-witness influence (co-
witness suggestibility) may be related to individual differences in personality (Doughty, 
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Paterson, MacCann, & Monds, 2017; Loftus, 2005; Wright et al., 2009). In her review of the 
misinformation effect, Loftus identified several personality traits that had been repeatedly 
associated with misinformation acceptance. In particular, the paper identified high levels of 
empathy, self-monitoring, absorption, and disassociation as key predictors of misinformation 
acceptance. (see Loftus 2005, for review). 
Some more general personality assessments have also been able to determine an 
individual’s vulnerability to co-witness influence. Using the Ten-Item Personality 
Questionnaire (TIPI; Gosling, Rentfrow, & Swan, 2003), Doughty et al. (2017) found that 
participants who scored lower on measures of openness, extraversion and neuroticism were 
significantly more susceptible to memory conformity, relative to higher scoring participants. 
Furthermore, Liebman et al., (2002) displayed a range of personality inventories (NEO OI- 
Revised; the Multidimensional Personality Questionnaire; Locus of Control; and Memory 
Efficacy) which could reliably predict the suggestibility of eyewitnesses to misleading 
questions. More specifically, the study found that eyewitnesses with a high external locus of 
control, low memory efficacy and high levels of neuroticism were significantly more 
vulnerable to interrogative suggestibility. Although much of the aforementioned studies were 
based on an eyewitness’s suggestibility to misleading interviews rather than to co-witnesses, 
comparative research suggests that the effects of interrogative suggestibility are co-morbid 
with co-witness suggestibility (Jack, Zydervelt, & Zajac, 2014; Thorley, 2013). 
 
Predicting co-witness suggestibility 
Whilst observations on general personality differences can allow researchers to identify the 
fundamental predictors of co-witness suggestibility, the present study proposed that co-
witness suggestibility could be predicted more accurately by observing the interpersonal 
characteristics of eyewitnesses. This is because the informational and normative pressures of 
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conformity are heavily mediated by the interpersonal characteristics of the targeted individual 
(Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004; Glomb & Liao, 2003; Heerdink, van Kleef, Homan, & Fischer, 
2013); due to the exchanging of information between individuals being a highly social 
interaction (Gabbert, Memon, Allan, & Wright, 2004) and the act of conformity being an 
interpersonal behaviour (Bass, 1960). The relationship between interpersonal characteristics 
and co-witness suggestibility was demonstrated by Wright and colleagues, who found that 
individuals with higher levels of social anxiety were more vulnerable to being influenced by a 
co-witness during memory recall, due to a greater fear of negative evaluation (Wright et al., 
2009). The findings fundamentally suggest that the individual differences in co-witness 
suggestibility may be accurately accounted for by the witness’s interpersonal characteristics. 
However, to date there is a serious lack of research investigating the interpersonal correlates 
of co-witness suggestibility. 
The ability to identify vulnerable eyewitnesses can bare significant benefits within a 
legal context. Through identifying witnesses who would be at a higher risk of reporting 
unwitnessed information, jurors and legal professionals would be able to assess the reliability 
of their statements more accurately; which in turn, may help reduce the risks of false 
convictions. In addition, through identifying the underlying causes for co-witness 
suggestibility, investigators may be able to work on implementing interventions to prevent 
vulnerable eyewitnesses from reporting unwitnessed information. 
One tool which has repeatedly been used to identify potential interpersonal correlates 
of conforming behaviour is the Fundamental Interpersonal Relations Orientation-Behaviour 
assessment (FIRO-B; Schutz, 1958) (see Huertas & Powell, 1986; Willcoxson & Chatam, 
2006). The self-assessment inventory measures the interpersonal characteristics of an 
individual through three interpersonal dimensions: Control, inclusion and affection. All three 
dimensions are measured through both expressed and wanted needs, creating a total of six 
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interpersonal scales. The control dimension reflects the degree to which an individual asserts 
control over the actions of others (expressed), and the degree to which an individual wants 
their actions to be controlled by others (wanted). The inclusion dimension reflects the degree 
to which an individual involves other people into their activities (expressed), and the degree 
to which they want to be included in the in the activities of others (wanted). Finally, the 
affection dimension reflects the level of emotional attachment that individuals place onto 
others (expressed), and the level of emotional attachment that individuals desire from others 
(wanted). 
Although the FIRO-B was initially developed as a clinical tool, it has been widely 
adopted by many researchers to accurately predict a magnitude of interpersonal behaviours 
such as loneliness (Jones, Freemon. & Goswick, 1981), partner control (Naydenova, 2007), 
and even domestic abuse (Poorman & Seelau, 2001). Despite receiving some criticisms for its 
supposed lack of construct validity (Mahoney & Stasson, 2005; Ryan, Maguire, & Ryan, 
1970), many research studies have demonstrated the reliability of the FIRO-B scales in 
consistently measuring the six interpersonal characteristics (Gluck, 1983; Kramer, 1967; 
Poorman & Seelau, 2001). Furthermore, Kramer (1967) compared the scores from all six 
scales with a self-reported rating of each corresponding trait. Rank order correlations 
indicated that five out of the six scales were significantly correlated with the self-reported 
ratings (excluding expressed inclusion), supporting the construct validity of the FIRO-B 
assessment.  
Previous research using the FIRO-B assessment have produced evidence suggesting a 
possible relationship between some of the scales and susceptibility to peer influence. The 
FIRO-B questionnaire was used by Huertas and Powell (1986) to successfully predict 
conforming behaviour within a different sample demographic. Using the inventory, the 
researchers examined the relationships between interpersonal characteristics and 
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suggestibility, in teams of participants during a group task. The results found significant 
positive correlations between conformity and the following interpersonal characteristics: 
expressed affection (r=.28), wanted affection (r=.27), expressed control (r=.32), and wanted 
control (r=.25).  Although the findings offer some insight on the interpersonal causes for 
suggestibility, many of the correlations observed may not be applicable to eyewitnesses. This 
is because the main aim of Heurtas and Powell’s study was to identify the effects of 
conformity to group leaders, with each group having a group leader appointed. In addition, 
participants within the study were asked to report their answers in front of their team 
members. Therefore, the relationship between wanted affection and expressed control with 
conformity may have been caused by an individual’s willingness to conform to the group to 
obtain the desired position of leadership (Huertas & Powell, 1986). To gain a more reliable 
understanding of the interpersonal correlates of co-witness suggestibility, a more direct 
observation is needed. However, to date, no study has attempted to directly examine the 
relationship between interpersonal characteristics and co-witness suggestibility.  
 
Misinformation size and co-witness influence 
Finally, it is worth mentioning the significant role misinformation size (the number of 
individuals presenting the misinformation) plays in mediating memory conformity during co-
witness discussions. Numerous research studies have identified a positive relationship 
between the size of the group providing the misinformation and the risk of memory 
conformity (Asch 1955; Bond, 2005; Latane, 1981; Thorley & Dewhurst, 2009; Vrij, Pannell, 
& Ost, 2005). In relation to co-witness influence, Walther et al., (2002) found that within 
simple memory recall tasks, participant eyewitnesses were more susceptible to co-witness 
influence, when the misinformation was presented by larger groups of co-witnesses (ten 
versus five).  
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Walther et al., (2002) also found that the risk of memory conformity was significantly 
reduced if other dissenters (co-witnesses who rejected the majority groups misinformation) 
were present, suggesting that the unanimity of misinformation may also be a significant 
mediator of co-witness influence. Theories on informational influence support this claim, 
many researchers have argued that for misinformation to have a significant influence on the 
target, it must also be unanimously held by the group (see Asch, 1955; Baron, Vandello & 
Brunsman, 1996). Moreover, Asch (1951) proposed that the presence of a dissenter would 
break the chain of consensus, and consequently, reduce level of influence a group would have 
on the targeted individual.  
Liebman et al., (2002) proposed that the relationship between personality differences 
and eyewitness suggestibility was heavily dependent on the experimental paradigm. 
Moreover, the it can be suggested that some personality differences may only be able to 
predict co-witness suggestibility under certain circumstances (i.e. only when the 
misinformation is presented unanimously or by a large majority). However, despite evidence 
suggesting that misinformation size can have a mediating effect on co-witness suggestibility, 
very little research has attempted to control for this variable when attempting to identify the 
personality correlates of eyewitness suggestibility (See Doughty et al., 2017; Liebman et al., 
2002). Therefore, the present study suggested that the relationship between personality 
differences and co-witness suggestibility should be repeatedly measured under different 
experimental conditions, to allow the researchers to make more accurate inferences from the 
results. 
The Current Study 
Although previous research has attempted to identify the relationship between general 
personality traits and co-witness suggestibility, the current researchers argue that a systematic 
observation on interpersonal characteristics will provide more reliable predictors of co-
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witness suggestibility. Furthermore, to date, most research studies on co-witness influence 
have only considered a singular measure for co-witness influence, memory conformity. 
Whilst observation on memory conformity can allow researchers to clearly determine 
whether an individual has been influenced by their co-witnesses, such an approach would 
assume that any participant who did not conform to the misinformation will not have been. 
However, research has found that eyewitnesses who do not conform to their co-witnesses 
may still be influenced by the misinformation through a loss of confidence in their reports 
(Allwood et al., 2005; Luus & Well, 1994). Based on this evidence, it can be argued that by 
solely relying on a dichotomous measure for co-witness influence, such as memory 
conformity, researchers may underestimate the true prevalence of co-witness influence.  
The first aim of this study was to explore the association between interpersonal 
characteristics and susceptibility to co-witness influence (co-witness suggestibility), whilst 
controlling for age, gender, and group characteristics (misinformation size and unanimity). 
The FIRO-B assessment was selected as an appropriate tool for measuring the interpersonal 
characteristics of the participants due to its extensive use in previous research for identifying 
interpersonal predictors of group behaviour (see Jones et al., 1981; Naydenova, 2007; 
Poorman & Seelau, 2001). To date, no research study has attempted to investigate the 
relationship between interpersonal characteristics and co-witness influence, making it 
difficult to confidently determine the direction of the relationships, if any. However, based on 
the available findings from general research on group conformity, the first hypothesis of the 
study predicted that participants who scored high on wanted control would be more 
vulnerable to co-witness influence (H1).  
The second aim of the present study was to investigate the effects of misinformation 
size and unanimity of misinformation on co-witness influence. The findings of previous 
research suggest that both misinformation size and unanimity of misinformation may have a 
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mediating effect on an individual’s vulnerability to co-witness influence, yet very few studies 
have attempted to control for these variables. Therefore, the researchers controlled for this 
effect, through conducting the trials under multiple different conditions where the number of 
confederate’s present was manipulated. Based on previous research on misinformation size 
and social influence (see Thorley & Dewhurst, 2009; Vrij et al., 2004), the following 
hypotheses were made: Participants would be more susceptible to co-witness influence, when 
the misinformation was presented unanimously (H2); and participants would be more 
susceptible to co-witness influence, when the misinformation was presented by a larger group 
of co-witnesses (H3).  
 
Methodology 
Participants 
The sample consisted of 473 participants from the United Kingdom. 224 were male (M age= 
29.3; range= 16-70; SD = 11.91) and 249 were female (M age= 28.58; range= 15-80; SD = 
11.77). Preliminary tests were undertaken to ensure that no participants had any serious 
visual impairments that would affect their ability to watch the crime footage on a computer 
screen. The request for participation was advertised through online media, as well as the 
circulation of flyers and posters within multiple cities. After gaining confirmation for 
participation, participants were randomly assigned to one of five experimental conditions, 
whilst ensuring a relatively even distribution of male and female participants within each 
experimental group. Additional descriptive tests were conducted to ensure that there was a 
relatively equal distribution of age within all conditions (See Table 1).  
The experiments were conducted over the duration of a year, and were sequentially 
carried out in order of condition. The differences in experiment dates had a mediating effect 
on the availability of participants for each condition, with some of the participants who were 
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allocated a later date dropping out. Resultantly, there were some disparities in sample size 
between each condition. Despite this level of variance, all experimental conditions were still 
of sufficient size for statistical comparisons to be made (in accordance with Stevens, 2009). 
 
Measures and Materials 
Visual Stimulus.  
The study used a real-life closed-circuit television (CCTV) footage of a bar fight erupting 
between two individuals. The footage lasted approximately one minute and thirty seconds 
and did not have an audio output. The footage depicts two men in distinctively different 
clothing (one man is wearing a yellow t-shirt whilst the other is wearing a dark green t-shirt) 
engaging in a conversation within a bar. Shortly after, one of the men (in the dark green t-
shirt) attacks the other (in the yellow t-shirt), causing a fight to start between both men. The 
fighting lasts for forty seconds before the two men are separated by multiple bystanders. The 
main point of interest within the footage was the indication that the man in the dark green t-
shirt had thrown the first punch.   
 
Fundamental Interpersonal Relations Orientation-Behaviour (FIRO-B; Schutz, 1958).  
The FIRO-B assessment was used as a measure for the participant’s interpersonal 
characteristics. The self-report assessment comprises of six scales (wanted control, expressed 
control; wanted inclusion, expressed inclusion, wanted affection, and expressed affection) 
which are measured through 54 mixed items (nine items per scale). The items are presented 
as statements about the individual’s interpersonal needs (e.g. “people control my actions”), 
the participant then scores their level of agreement with each statement through a six-point 
scale (six indicating maximum agreement). Each item is scored dichotomously (zero or one 
mark awarded) depending on the participant’s level of agreement with the statement. The 
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scoring criteria is set out by the FIRO-B Manual and varies between each item. The scores 
are then totalled to produce six overall scores, ranging between zero and nine (with nine 
indicating the strongest presence of the interpersonal characteristic), for each scale. 
 The six FIRO-B scales were constructed using the Guttman scaling design, which 
suggests that the scales would bare high levels of reproducibility (Babbie, 2013). Schutz 
(1978) demonstrated the reliability of the assessment through testing the reproducibility of 
the scales. As predicted, the results reported suitable reproducibility coefficients for all 
scales, ranging between .93 and .94. The FIRO-B has also been shown to have adequate test-
retest reliability (Gluck, 1983; Hutcherson, 1965; Schutz, 1978). Schutz (1978) found that 
after a one-month duration, the test-retest coefficients were as follows: .82 for expressed 
inclusion, .75 for wanted inclusion, .80 for expressed affection, .73 for wanted affection, .74 
for expressed control, and .71 for wanted control. In light of the aforementioned research 
literature surrounding the validity of the FIRO-B assessment, the present researchers argued 
that despite some of the criticisms received, the assessment remains as a reliable predictor for 
interpersonal characteristics. Based on the primary aim of the present study focusing on the 
interpersonal correlates of co-witness influence, it was settled that the FIRO-B assessment 
would be suited as the most appropriate scale for the present study.  
Using the present study’s data, preliminary tests were conducted by the researchers to 
assess the internal validity of the assessment. A one-way multivariate analysis of variance 
(MANOVA) was conducted on the mean scores of the FIRO-B scales within each 
experimental condition. The analysis found that with the exception of the wanted affection 
scale, the other five scales remained consistent between all experimental conditions, F (24, 
1616.42) = 2.21, p <.05; Wilk’s Λ = .89, partial η2 = .03; suggesting that five out of the six 
scales possessed good internal validity. 
Design and Procedure 
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A mixed design was employed, with participants being randomly allocated to one of five 
independent conditions. The group conditions were used to manipulate the independent 
variables of misinformation size (size of the group presenting the misinformation) and 
unanimity of misinformation, through altering the number of participants and confederates 
(misinformation source) present during the trials. As Table 1 illustrates, the misinformation 
was guaranteed to be presented unanimously in conditions four and five due to the participant 
being placed into a confederate-only group. Whereas in conditions two and three, the 
presence of multiple true participants meant that the participants were likely to encounter 
other dissenters, breaking the chain of unanimity. However, a caveat of the present study’s 
design is that participants within conditions two and three may have still been subjected to 
misinformation from a unanimous group, if the remaining participants had all erroneously 
provided misleading responses. In spite of this risk, the researchers argued that statistically, it 
would have been highly likely for at least one dissenter to be present within the majority of 
the trials in conditions two and three.  
INSERT TABLE 1 
The FIRO-B scores for each six scales were used as predictor variables of co-witness 
suggestibility. Co-witness suggestibility was measured through two dependent variables, the 
response given by the participants when asked to identify which man had thrown the first hit 
(memory report), and the level of confidence the participants placed in their response 
(eyewitness confidence).  
Due to the ethical considerations of exposing participants to violent footage, 
participants were informed that they would be viewing a CCTV footage that contained 
violence, in order to gain consent from them. Details with regards to the aims of the 
experiment were kept to a minimum. Participants watched the footage simultaneously in their 
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groups, on a monitor screen. The footage lasted one minute and thirty seconds, and depicted a 
man in a dark green top starting a fight with another man in a yellow top by punching him.  
After the footage had finished, participants were allocated one minute to discuss in 
their groups, who they believed had thrown the first hit. Confederates were used to expose 
the participants to co-witness misinformation by suggesting that the wrong man (in the 
yellow t-shirt) had started the fight. The group discussions were capped at one minute to 
ensure that no participant could question the confederates for a significantly longer period 
than another participant from a separate trial. The experimenter left the room during the 
group discussion to prevent their presence from influencing the participant’s behaviour. 
Participants in the control groups were not permitted to discuss the footage with co-witnesses, 
instead, they were asked to sit silently until they were called to leave the room for 
questioning.  
The next phase was the eyewitness statement process, participants were then taken 
into a private room individually and asked to identify who they believed had thrown the first 
hit, alternatively, they were given the option to state that they were uncertain. The interviewer 
advised all participants to only report information that they remembered seeing. All 
participants produced one of three responses, when asked to identify which man had thrown 
the first hit. Eyewitnesses who blamed the man in the yellow top (misinformation) were 
scored as being incorrect, participants who blamed the man in the dark green top were scored 
as being correct, and participants who stated that they were uncertain were scored as being 
unsure.  In addition to making their response, participants were also asked to indicate how 
confident they were in their judgment. Keeping in line with previous research on eyewitness 
confidence (see Mudd & Govern, 2004), confidence judgements were measured using a five-
point scale (five meaning maximum confidence). Participants who answered “unsure” were 
not asked to give a confidence rating due to their inability to identify an offender.  
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Finally, the participants were instructed to complete a copy of the FIRO-B assessment 
privately. After the experiment had finished, all participants were debriefed and thanked for 
their participation.  
Results  
The main results are presented in two sections. First, evidence for the relationship between 
interpersonal characteristics and group characteristics (unanimity of misinformation and 
misinformation size) with co-witness suggestibility is given through analyses of eyewitness 
memory reports (first dependent variable). The second section of the results investigates the 
relationship between interpersonal characteristics and group characteristics with co-witness 
suggestibility through analyses of eyewitness confidence (second dependent variable). Means 
and standard deviations for all variables are presented in Table 2, and the correlations 
between predictor variables are presented in Table 3.  
INSERT TABLE 2 
INSERT TABLE 3 
 
Predicting eyewitness suggestibility, through response accuracy. 
Control Group 
The results from the control group (condition one) offer an indication of how well 
participants performed on the eyewitness task, when no misinformation was presented. 
Although most participants were able to produce a correct response (42.7%), a large 
proportion of the participants blamed the wrong man for throwing the first hit (33.9%), and 
an additional 23.4% of the participants stated that they were uncertain (See Table 2); 
suggesting that the task difficulty was moderately high. The study purposely used an 
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ambiguous task due to research suggesting that informational influence is more effective in 
the presence of uncertainty (Walther et al., 2002). 
The results from participants in the control condition were analysed to ensure that the 
FIRO-B scales had no inherent relationship with general response accuracy. A series of 
multinomial logistic regressions were used to analyse the relationship between FIRO-B 
scores and eyewitness memory reports when no group discussion was permitted. The analysis 
found that the model fit was not significant, χ² (12, N=171) = 8.32, p > .05. The results 
indicated that there was no relationship between the FIRO-B scales and report accuracy, in 
participants who did not partake in a co-witness discussion. Therefore, any relationships 
observed between the FIRO-B scales and report accuracy within the experimental conditions 
could be attributed to co-witness discussions. 
 
Investigating the relationship between FIRO-B scores and group charactersitcs, with 
eyewitness memory reports. 
First, the study wanted to establish whether there were any relationships between the 
interpersonal characteristics of an eyewitness and their susceptibility to memory conformity, 
whilst controlling for age and gender. In addition, the researchers wanted to determine 
whether the size and unanimity of the misinformation had a mediating effect on the risk of 
co-witness influence. To investigate these relationships, multinomial logistic regression was 
used to analyse the effects of the FIRO-B scores and group conditions on the participant’s 
memory reports. Preliminary analyses were conducted to ensure no violation of the 
assumptions of normality, linearity, and homoscedasticity.  Due to the dependent variable 
consisting of three outcomes, two regressions were conducted: one with the incorrect 
response (yellow top; misinformation) as the reference category, and one with the correct 
response (dark green top) as the reference category. The analysis found that the model fit was 
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significant, χ² (24, N=473) = 85.28, p < .001, indicating that both full models predicted 
significantly better, or more accurately, than the null model. 
The first column in Table 4 has the outcome of “correct response” compared to 
“incorrect response” (reference category). In relation to the experimental conditions, the 
results suggested that participants who were exposed to misinformation from a unanimous 
majority group (conditions 4, OR= .09; and 5, OR= .04), compared to participants from the 
control condition, were significantly more likely to report the misinformation (incorrect 
response). The measures of association were very large, in accordance to Cohen (1988). The 
effect size, calculated using Cohen’s d, was -1.33 and - 1.77, respectively. The data suggested 
that exposure to misinformation that was not unanimous (conditions 2 and 3) did not seem to 
have any effect on the participants’ reports. In relation to the FIRO-B scales, the results 
suggested that participants who scored higher on the wanted control scale (OR=.89) were 
significantly more likely to report the misinformation (incorrect response). However, the 
measure of association was very small, in accordance to Cohen (1988). The effect size, 
calculated using Cohen’s d, was -.06. The data suggested that the remaining FIRO-B scales 
could not reliably predict the eyewitness’s memory report.  
The second Column in Table 4 has the outcome of “unsure” compared to “incorrect 
response” (Reference category). In relation to the experimental conditions, the results 
suggested that participants who were exposed to misinformation from a unanimous majority 
group (conditions 4, OR= .27; and 5, OR= .17), compared to participants from the control 
condition, were significantly more likely to report the misinformation (incorrect response). 
The measures of association were medium to large, in accordance to Cohen (1988). The 
effect size, calculated using Cohen’s d, was -.72 and - .98, respectively. The data suggested 
that exposure to misinformation that was not unanimous (conditions 2 and 3) did not seem to 
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have any effect on the participants’ responses. The data also suggested that none of the FIRO-
B scales could reliably predict the eyewitness’s memory reports. 
The third Column in Table 4 has the outcome of “unsure” compared to “correct 
response” (Reference category). The results suggest that the experimental condition was not a 
reliable predictor of eyewitness response accuracy. Participants who scored higher on 
expressed inclusion (OR=.85) were significantly more likely to produce a correct response. 
However, the measure of association was very small, in accordance to Cohen (1988). The 
effect size, calculated using Cohen’s d, was -.09. The data suggested that none of the other 
scales could reliably predict the eyewitness’s memory reports. 
INSERT TABLE 4 
The researchers then calculated and compared the percentage of correct, incorrect and 
unsure memory reports (dependent variable) from participants in conditions four and five 
(independent variable), to determine whether the change in misinformation size influenced 
response accuracy. This analysis was subjected to a 2 X 3 chi-square test of independence. 
The analysis found no significant association between the misinformation size and 
eyewitness memory reports, χ2 (2, N = 76) = .93, p >.05.  
 
Predicting eyewitness suggestibility, through eyewitness confidence. 
For the second part of the results, the confidence judgements of participants who answered 
correctly and incorrectly were analysed to determine whether exposure to co-witness 
misinformation influenced the level of confidence that participants placed in their responses. 
Moreover, the researchers wanted to determine whether the relationship between co-witness 
misinformation and eyewitness confidence was mediated by either the group characteristics 
or the interpersonal characteristics of the individual. No significant correlations were 
observed between the FIRO-B scores and eyewitness confidence, within the control 
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condition. Therefore, any observed relationships between the variables within the 
experimental conditions could be attributed as an effect of the co-witness discussion. 
 
Eyewitness confidence in correct responses. 
Hierarchical multiple regression was performed to investigate the ability of the FIRO-
B scales and the group condition as predictors of eyewitness confidence (dependent variable), 
in participants who did not conform to the confederates. The variables of participant and 
gender were also controlled for. Preliminary analyses were conducted to ensure no violation 
of the assumptions of normality, linearity, and homoscedasticity.  
In the first step of hierarchical multiple regression, the first predictor (group 
condition) was entered, as well as the controlled variables (age and gender). This model was 
not statistically significant F (3, 108) = .81; p > .05 and explained 2.2% of variance in 
confidence scores (see Table 5), suggesting that none of the variables were related to 
confidence scores. After entry of FIRO-B scores at Step 2, the total variance explained by the 
model as a whole was 19% (F (9, 102) = 2.66; p < .01). The introduction of the FIRO-B 
scores explained an additional 17% of variance in confidence (R2 Change = .17; F (6, 102) = 
3.52; p < .005). In the final adjusted model, one out of six predictor variables were 
statistically significant (wanted control; r=-.36), with a Beta value of (β = -.27, p < .05). The 
measure of association was medium, in accordance to Cohen (1988). The effect size, 
calculated using Cohen’s d, was -.56. 
INSERT TABLE 5 
 Eyewitness confidence in incorrect responses. 
A similar hierarchical multiple regression analysis was then conducted on participants who 
produced incorrect responses, to investigate the ability of the FIRO-B scales and group 
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condition as predictors of eyewitness statement confidence, in participants who reported the 
misinformation in their memory reports.  
In the first step of hierarchical multiple regression, the first predictor (group 
condition) was entered, as well as the controlled variables (age and gender). This model was 
not statistically significant F (3, 138) = 2.21; p > .05 and explained less than 4.6% of variance 
in confidence scores (see Table 8), suggesting that none of the variables were related to 
confidence scores. After entry of FIRO-B scores at Step 2, the total variance explained by the 
model as a whole was 11.7% (F (9, 132) = 1.94; p > .05). The introduction of interpersonal 
characteristic scores explained an additional 7% of variance in confidence (R2 Change = .07; 
F (6, 132) = 1.77; p > .05). In the final adjusted model, one out of six predictor variables were 
statistically significant (wanted control; r=-.24), with a Beta value of (β = -.24, p < .05). The 
measure of association was small, in accordance to Cohen (1988). The effect size, calculated 
using Cohen’s d, was -.49. 
INSERT TABLE 6 
 
 
Discussion 
FIRO-B and Co-witness Suggestibility 
The first aim of this study was to explore the associations between interpersonal 
characteristics and susceptibility to co-witness influence, whilst controlling for age, gender, 
and group characteristics. The FIRO-B scales of wanted and expressed control, affection, and 
inclusion were examined to determine their abilities in predicting memory conformity and 
eyewitness confidence (measures of co-witness suggestibility). Only two, out of the six, 
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FIRO-B scales were significantly related to co-witness suggestibility; wanted control and 
express inclusion. 
FIRO-B scales and memory conformity. 
Based on the findings of Huertas and Powell (1986), the present study first predicted 
that participants who scored high on the wanted control scale would be more vulnerable to 
co-witness influence (H2). The results indicated that after encountering co-witness 
misinformation, participants who scored higher on the wanted control scale were more likely 
to report the misinformation in their statements. Contrastingly, no such relationship between 
wanted control scores and incorrect responses existed within the control condition, suggesting 
that individuals who scored higher on the wanted control scale were more likely to be 
influenced by their co-witnesses into producing an erroneous response; supporting the first 
hypothesis. 
Although the present study was the first to use the FIRO-B assessment in predicting 
co-witness suggestibility, previous studies have identified strong relationships between 
eyewitness suggestibility and other personality traits related to wanted control. Within a 
similar experiment to the present study, Liebman and colleagues found that participants with 
a high external locus of control were more vulnerable to being misled by their co-witnesses 
(Liebman et al., 2002). Concurrently, individuals who score high on the wanted control scale 
are likely to exhibit a significantly high external locus of control (Stimpson, and Maughan, 
1978). Based on the co-existing relationship between these two traits, the present researchers 
postulated that eyewitnesses with high wanted control may have been more susceptible to 
accepting misinformation from co-witnesses, due to their persistent reliance on external 
forces in determining their decisions. Also, Doughty et al. (2017) found that introverted 
participants were more susceptible to including misinformation from co-witnesses into their 
memory reports. Although the FIRO-B assessment does not directly measure an individual’s 
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level of introversion, individuals with high wanted control display similar personality traits to 
introverts. Namely, both introverts and individuals with a high level of wanted control tend to 
be submissive in nature (Gilbert & Allan, 1994; Schutz, 1958). Individuals with submissive 
personalities are more likely to exhibit perceptions of inferior social rank and are therefore, 
more likely to conform to those that they perceive as being more powerful (Gilbert, 1993). 
Thus, the relationship between wanted control and co-witness suggestibility can also be 
attributed to the submissive personality of these eyewitness.  
Although previous research can offer some explanation for the relationship between 
wanted control and co-witness suggestibility, it must be acknowledged that the effect size of 
this relationship was weak. Given the very small effect size measured between wanted 
control and co-witness suggestibility, the researchers argued that the implications of the 
observed relationship should be interpreted cautiously. 
The results also suggested that eyewitnesses with higher needs for expressed inclusion 
were more likely to be correct in their reports, than to be unsure, after exposure to co-witness 
misinformation. However, once again, the effect size for this relationship was very small and 
the relationship was not found when comparing uncertain responses to incorrect responses. 
Therefore, the present study proposes that this unexpected finding may have been a statistical 
artefact. 
Firo-B and eyewitness confidence. 
The analysis of eyewitness confidence identified a negative relationship between wanted 
control scores and eyewitness confidence, in eyewitnesses who produced both incorrect and 
correct responses. However, this relationship was not present for participants within the 
control condition, suggesting that exposure to co-witness discussions had a negative impact 
on the confidence of eyewitnesses with high wanted control scores. The results suggest that 
eyewitnesses with high wanted control scores were more influenced by disconfirming 
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statements than by conforming statements. Again, this behaviour can be attributed to the 
submissive nature of participants with high wanted control scores.  Witnesses with 
submissive personalities tend to exhibit low levels of self-esteem (Gilbert & Allan, 1994; 
Pulford & Sohal, 2006). Consequently, individuals with low self-esteem would have more 
difficulty in gaining confidence through confirmatory feedback (McFarlin & Blascovich, 
1981); but would still be more vulnerable to losing confidence from disconfirmatory 
feedback, compared to individuals with higher self-esteem (Young, 2000). However, the 
researchers suggest that further, more direct, research is needed to support the proposed 
relationship between wanted control and confirmatory/disconfirmatory feedback. 
Group characteristic and co-witness influence. 
The effects of group characteristics on memory conformity. 
The second aim of the present study was to investigate the effects of misinformation size and 
unanimity of misinformation on co-witness influence. The researchers first predicted (H2) 
that participants would be more susceptible to co-witness influence, when the misinformation 
was presented unanimously. The first analysis found that exposure to misinformation that 
was not unanimously held by all co-witnesses (conditions 2 and 3) did not seem to have any 
significant effect on memory conformity. However, the rates of incorrect responses were 
significantly higher, when participants were exposed to misinformation from a unanimous 
majority (conditions four and five), supporting the second hypothesis. The results suggested 
that misinformation was only influential when unanimously held by all co-witnesses. 
The findings lie in agreement with that of Walther et al. (2002). Similarly, Walther and 
colleagues found that the risk of co-witness influence was significantly reduced when 
multiple dissenters were present within an eyewitness group. The relationship between the 
unanimity of misinformation and co-witness influence can be explained through the process 
of information influence. For informational influence to be effective, the target must believe 
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that the information source is more likely to be correct than them (French et al., 2011; 
Williamson et al., 2013). However, the presence of a dissenter would provide the individual 
with an independent view of the event, which could evoke an increase in doubt over the 
accuracy of the misinformation source and increase the individual’s confidence in their 
original report (Festinger, 1954; Walther et al., 2002). The implications of these findings 
suggest that the true risk of co-witness influence within real investigations may be lower than 
anticipated by research studies that only measured co-witness suggestibility to unanimous 
groups.  
Finally, the researcher predicted (H3) that participants would also be more susceptible 
to co-witness influence, when the misinformation was presented by a larger group of co-
witnesses. Additional tests were conducted to compare the response accuracy between 
participants in conditions four and five, to determine whether the size of the misinformation 
source (two versus five) influenced co-witness suggestibility. The results found no significant 
differences in the rates of incorrect responses between the two conditions, suggesting that a 
misinformation size of two was as influential as a misinformation size of five. Resultantly, 
the third hypothesis was not supported by the present findings. However, the researchers 
attributed the insignificant relationship between misinformation size and co-witness influence 
on the study’s choice of confederate sizes. The current study involved groups of one, two, or 
five confederates, whereas most of the previous research on misinformation size and social 
influence have looked at confederate groups of one to three (see Asch, 1955; Campbell & 
Fairey, 1989; Gerard, Wilhelmy, & Conolley, 1968; Rosenberg, 1961; Stang, 1976). 
Although there was no significant difference between misinformation from two and five 
confederates, both groups produced significantly more incorrect responses than single 
confederates. Asch (1952) suggested that after the addition of a third information source, the 
respondent would view the group as one collective source of information; subsequently, any 
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additional group members would have very little effect on the level of social influence. 
Therefore, it can be suggested that there may be an initial relationship between 
misinformation size and co-witness influence that plateaus after a majority size of two is 
reached. Nonetheless, the analyses of the group conditions indicate that the unanimity of 
misinformation is significantly more important than the size, in influencing eyewitnesses. 
The effects of group characterstics on eyewitness confidence. 
Interestingly, neither misinformation size nor the unanimity of misinformation had a 
mediating effect on the confidence judgements of participants. The mean confidence scores 
in both correct and incorrect responses remained relatively constant across all experimental 
conditions. The results suggest that the effects of encountering misinformation on eyewitness 
confidence may be predominately mediated by internal factors, such as the individual’s 
personality (Bothwell, Brigham, & Pigott, 1987), rather than by external factors.  
 
Limitations and directions for future research 
The study is the first in the literature to examine the interpersonal correlates of co-witness 
suggestibility, but indubitably, there are limitations. The FIRO-B questionnaire has come 
under criticism for its supposed lack of construct validity (Ryan et al., 1970). More 
specifically, Mahoney and Stasson (2005) underlined the assessments inability to distinctly 
differentiate between the Affection and Inclusion dimensions. Failure to distinguish between 
the two dimensions suggests that the FIRO-B assessment may have failed to accurately 
measure the characteristics of affection and inclusion; however, a test of mullticollinearity on 
the present data indicated that the two different dimensions did not measure the same 
variable. Furnham (1990) investigated the feasibility of faking the FIRO-B assessment to 
gain a desirable personality score. The results found that participants could manipulate their 
answers to score high on desirable personality traits and score low on undesirable personality 
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traits. The findings indicate that some participants within the present study may have 
answered the assessment untruthfully due to an inherent social desirability effect. Criticisms 
of the FIRO-B assessment suggest that a more validated assessment may help produce a more 
accurate measurement for the relationship between salient personality traits and co-witness 
suggestibility.  
The relationship between Wanted Control and co-witness suggestibility suggests that 
self-confidence and perceived social rank may be key mediators for this form of 
informational influence (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955; Di Vesta, 1959; Gilbert, 1993; Kaplan & 
Miller, 1987). It can be inferred that by observing these characteristics directly, researchers 
may be able to develop a more reliable measure for predicting co-witness suggestibility. The 
Rosenberg Self-esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1965) has been validated as a reliable measure 
(McKay, Boduszek, & Harvey, 2014). A fruitful direction for future research in continuation 
of the present findings will therefore be to utilise such scales in conjunction with the Wanted 
Control dimension, to compose a more appropriate assessment for measuring co-witness 
suggestibility. 
In relation to the experimental design, there were some limitations with the way that 
the unanimity of misinformation was manipulated. The inclusion of multiple participants, 
against one confederate, were used in conditions two and three to break the unanimity of the 
misinformation. However, based on the response rates in the control condition (i.e. 33.9% 
producing a false response), it is likely that some of the participants in the group discussions 
will have also reported misinformation. Therefore, there will have been a small possibility 
that participants in these conditions may have still been exposed to misinformation from a 
unanimous group of co-witnesses. Future research could manipulate the unanimity of 
misinformation more reliably by adopting the experimental design used by Walther et al., 
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(2002). In their study, Walther and colleagues manipulated the unanimity of misinformation 
by using confederate dissenters (confederates used to purposely suggest correct information). 
Conclusion 
The FIRO-B assessment, in its entirety, was not an accurate predictor for co-witness 
suggestibility, with only one of the dimensions demonstrating consistent, accuracy. 
Nevertheless, alone, the Wanted Control dimension was accurate in predicting co-witness 
suggestibility through memory conformity and eyewitness confidence. The researchers 
attributed this relationship to the submissive nature of eyewitnesses with higher needs of 
wanted control rendering them more susceptible to informational influence. The findings 
demonstrate that co-witness suggestibility can be predicted for through interpersonal 
characteristics; however, the researchers propose that a more accurate measure of 
interpersonal characteristics could allow researchers to make more reliable predictions of an 
eyewitness’s vulnerability to co-witness influence. 
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Table 1.  
Participant information for each experimental condition. 
Condition  N Group size True participants Confederates Age  
     M S.D 
1 (Control) 171 1 1 0 31.22  13.48 
2 56 3 2 1 26.48 9.09 
3 170 6 5 1 28.32 11.17 
4 38 3 1 2 21.84 3.87 
5 38 6 1 5 31.97 12.13 
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 Table 2.  
Means and standard deviations of FIRO-B scales for all conditions 
 N (%) M Confidence WC EC WA EA WI EI 
  (Std. Dev) M S.D M S.D M S.D M S.D M S.D M S.D 
Condition 1 171 2.95 (1.1) 4.71 2.58 3.2 2.69 4.91 2.78 4.2 2.11 4.82 3.06 4.86 2.19 
Correct 73 (42.7%) 2.9 (1.19) 4.56 2.71 3.52 2.83 4.59 2.71 3.92 1.99 4.97 3.24 5 2.18 
Incorrect 58 (33.9%) 3 (1.08) 4.89 2.25 2.86 2.38 5.17 2.87 4.52 2.02 4.69 2.84 4.95 1.99 
Unsure 40 (23.4%) a 4.7 2.85 3.13 2.9 5.1 2.8 4.28 2.43 4.73 3.11 4.48 2.47 
Condition 2 56 3.3 (1.03) 4.09 2.6 2.25 2.61 5.77 2.48 4.16 2.33 5.13 3.09 4.96 2.22 
Correct 26 (46.4%) 3.5 (1.03) 4.04 2.54 2.38 2.62 5.58 2.76 4.23 1.88 5.04 3.09 5.31 2.35 
Incorrect 20 (35.7%) 3.05 (1) 4.1 2.88 2.8 2.95 5.65 2.48 4.3 2.85 5.3 3.03 4.95 2.14 
Unsure 10 (17.9%) a 4.2 2.44 .8 1.03 6.5 1.65 3.7 2.41 5 3.5 4.1 2.02 
Condition 3 170 3.19 (1.13) 4.8 2.68 3.16 3.83 5.45 2.54 4.09 2.28 4.92 3.01 4.91 2.36 
Correct 80 (47.1%) 3.4 (1.11) 4.24 2.7 3.52 2.83 5.86 2.4 4.29 2.17 5.25 2.91 5.15 2.57 
Incorrect 61 (35.9%) 2.92 (1.11) 5.61 2.64 2.61 2.8 5.26 2.5 3.72 2.48 4.64 3.01 4.75 2.05 
Unsure 29 (17.1%) a 4.66 2.41 2.64 2.66 4.61 2.82 4.31 2.12 4.62 3.28 4.58 2.37 
Condition 4 38 3.36 (.82) 4.29 2.43 3.95 2.52 5.55 1.88 4.76 1.92 5.92 2.17 5.55 2.27 
Correct 4 (10.5%) 3.25 (.5) 3.25 1.5 7 2.16 5.75 2.06 3.25 .96 6.5 2.38 5.25 2.63 
Incorrect 29 (76.3%) 3.38 (.86) 4.83 2.11 3.17 2.05 5.48 2.03 5 2.07 5.79 2.29 5.62 2.31 
Unsure 5 (13.2%) a 2 3.46 6 2.65 5.8 .84 4.6 .89 6.2 1.48 5.4 2.3 
Condition 5 38 3.41 (1.05) 4.18 2.14 3.55 2.18 4.76 2.2 4.3 2.17 5.55 1.88 5.76 1.68 
Correct 2 (5.3%) 3 (1.41) 4.56 2.71 5.5 2.12 4.5 .71 6 1.41 6.5 .71 6.5 .7 
Incorrect 32 (84.2%) 3.44 (1.04) 4.09 2.2 3.47 2.14 4.75 2.27 5.28 1.73 5.63 2 5.81 1.64 
Unsure 4 (10.5%) a 5.25 2.06 3.25 2.63 5 2.45 5.75 .5 4.5 .58 5 2.45 
Note. a= No confidence scores was recorded for participants who answered “unsure” due to 
their inability to attribute blame. 
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Table 3 
Descriptive statistics, and correlations for all continuous variables (N = 473). 
Variables C a Age WC EC WA EA WI EI 
Confidence a 1 .05 -.14** .09* .01 -.04 .01 .004 
Age .05 1 -.12** .01 .04 .01 -.03 -.08* 
Wanted Control -.14** -.12** 1 -.26*** -.09* .07 -.1* .06 
Expressed Control .09* .01 -.26*** 1 .07 .05 .19*** .11** 
Wanted Affection .01 .04 -.09* .07 1 .39*** .42*** .29*** 
Expressed Affection -.04 .01 .07 .05 .39*** 1 .18*** .28*** 
Wanted Inclusion .01 -.03 -.1* .19*** .42*** .18*** 1 .59*** 
Expressed Inclusion .004 -.08* .06 .11** .29*** .28*** .59*** 1 
Means 3.12 28.92 4.59 3.16 5.25 4.3 5.04 5.02 
Standard Deviations 1.19 11.83 2.58 3.11 2.57 2.17 2.91 2.24 
Range  1-5 15-80 0-9 0-9 0-9 0-9 0-9 0-9 
Note. . a= missing data for “unsure” participants were replaced by confidence average score. Statistical significance Statistical significance: 
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
  
Personality and Co-Witness Suggestibility 
 
41 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. 
 Multinomial logistic regression predicting eyewitness response accuracy. 
Note. a= Reference group: ‘incorrect response’ (n=200); b= Reference group: ‘correct response’ (n=185).      OR = Odds Ratio.  SE = 
Standard Error. 95% CI = Confidence Interval. * p<.05. ** p<0.005. *** p<0.001 
  
   Correct response (N=185)   Unsurea (N=88) Unsureb (N=88) 
Variable SE OR (95% CI)  SE OR (95% CI)  SE OR (95% CI)  
Age .01 .99 (.97/1.01) .01 1.01(.99/1.03) .01 1.02(1/1.04) 
Gender           
     Male .23 1 (.64/1.56) .27  1.33 (.78/2.27) .27  1.33 (.78/2.27) 
     Female   1  1  1 
Condition       
      1  1  1  1 
      2 .36 .98 (.49/2) .45 .77 (.32/1.33) .44 .79 (.33/1.85) 
      3 .25 1.05 (.64/1.72) .31 .72 (.39/1.33) .3 .69 (.38/1.24) 
      4 .58 .09 (.03/.27)*** .55 .27 (.09/.8)* .72 3.21 (.78/13.12) 
      5 .76 .04 (.01/.19)*** .56 .17 (.05/.53)*** .9 3.94 (.68/22.97) 
Wanted Control .05 .89 (.81/98)* .06 .95 (.85/1.05) .06 1.06 (.95/1.18) 
Expressed Control .04 1.05 (.97/1.14) .05  1.05 (.95/1.15) .04 1 (.91/1.09) 
Wanted Inclusion .05  1.01 (.91/1.11) .06 1.03 (.92/ 1.16) .06 1.03 (.91/1.16) 
Expressed Inclusion .07   1.06 (.93/1.2) .08 .9 (.78/1.04) .07 .85 (.73/.99)* 
Wanted Affection .05  .98 (.88/1.08) .06  .99 (.87/ 1.12) .06 1.01 (.89/1.15) 
Expressed Affection .06 .99 (.88/1.11) .07 1.05(.92/1.2) .07 1.06 (.93/1.21) 
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Table 5. 
 Hierarchical Regression Model of eyewitness confidence for correct responses. 
 R R2 R2 Change B SE β t 
 
Step 1 
 
.15 
 
.02 
 
 
    
Age    .01 .01 .13 1.35 
Gender    .04 .2 .02 .22 
Condition     -.13 .18 -.07 -.73 
        
Step 2 .44 .19 .17**     
Age    .01 .01 .05 .55 
Gender    .17 .2 .08 .85 
Condition    -2.3 .18 -.12 -.29 
Wanted Control    -.11 .04 -.27* -2.58 
Expressed Control    .08 .04 .22 2 
Wanted Affection    .03 .05 .07 .62 
Expressed Affection     -.02 .05 -.04 -.42 
Wanted Inclusion    -.03 .05 -.09 -.64 
Expressed Inclusion    .06 .06 .15 1.14 
Note. Statistical significance: *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
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Table 6 
Hierarchical Regression Model of eyewitness confidence for incorrect responses. 
 R R2 R2 Change B SE β t 
 
Step 1 
 
.21 
 
.05 
 
 
    
Age    .01 .01 .05 .64 
Gender    -.19 .18 -.09 -1.09 
Condition    .19 .09 .18* 2.16 
        
Step 2 .34 .12 .07     
Age    .001 .01 -.002 -.02 
Gender    -.15 .18 -.07 -.83 
Condition    .16 .09 .15 1.66 
Wanted Control    -.1 .04 -.24** -2.65 
Expressed Control    .04 .04 .09 1.04 
Wanted Affection    -.05 .04 -.12 -1.2 
Expressed Affection     -.003 .04 -.01 -.08 
Wanted Inclusion    -.02 .04 -.05 -.43 
Expressed Inclusion    -.001 .05 .001 .01 
Note. Statistical significance: *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
 
 
 
